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THE ROLE OF COURTS VIS-A-VIS LEGISLATURES IN THE
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE CONTEXT: SEXUAL ORIENTATION
AS A SUSPECT CLASSIFICATION
INGRID

M. LOFGREN*

I. INTRODUCTION

The proper role of the judiciary vis-d-vis the legislature in
recognition of emergent minority rights is central to the heated debate
over same-sex marriage in the United States.' Courts have repeatedly
grappled with the appropriate standard to address legislative acts
which discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, applying varying
degrees of equal protection scrutiny. 2 Nevertheless, Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection jurisprudence establishes that courts
must closely scrutinize government actions that make use of suspect
classifications, or characteristics that meet a series of criteria
indicating that they are likely the subject of discrimination. 3 In order to
guard against impermissible discrimination, government actions that
make use of suspect classifications must be "narrowly tailored to
further a compelling government interest" to pass constitutional
Copyright © 2009 by Ingrid M. Lofgren.
* J.D. Candidate 2010, University of Maryland School of Law. M.S.W. 2009, University of
Maryland School of Social Work. B.S. 2005, University of Maryland. The author would like
to thank Professor Jana Singer for her encouragement and support.
1. See e.g., Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 220-22 (N.J. 2006) (holding that
committed same-sex couples must be afforded the same rights and benefits enjoyed by
opposite-sex couples, but stating that
it is not our role to suggest whether the Legislature should either amend
the marriage statutes to include same-sex couples or enact a civil union
scheme. Our role here is limited to constitutional adjudication, and
therefore we must steer clear of the swift and treacherous currents of
social policy when we have no constitutional compass with which to
navigate.);
Peter Hendersen, California gay marriage battle turns to court role, REUTERS, Jan. 5, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE5050JB20090106?feedType=RSS&feedNa
me=topNews.
2. See generally Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989)
(applying strict scrutiny to invalidate army regulations discriminating on the basis of sexual
orientation); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (finding that a Colorado amendment
banning statutory protections on the basis of sexual orientation fails even rational basis
review).
3. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (describing
suspect classifications as "factors that are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any
legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect
prejudice and antipathy").
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muster.4 Accordingly, judicial analysis of sexual orientation is of vital
importance in the marriage equality context because it determines the
degree of deference courts afford to legislative classifications
excluding same-sex couples and their children from the full benefits of
civil marriage.
Within a nine month period between September 2007 and May
2008, the highest courts in both Maryland and California confronted
whether laws that classify on the basis of sexual orientation warrant
heightened equal protection scrutiny in the context of constitutional
challenges to statutory bans on same-sex marriage. 5 The Maryland
Court of Appeals and the California Supreme Court took dramatically
different approaches to framing sexual orientation and lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) class status.6 The courts ultimately
reached opposite conclusions
regarding the constitutionality of the
7
marriage statutes at issue.
In Conaway v. Deane and Polyak, et al.,8 the Maryland Court9
of Appeals held that sexual orientation is not a suspect classification.
The Conaway court reasoned that LGBT persons are not sufficiently
politically powerless to necessitate enhanced judicial protection and0
that sexual orientation is not a conclusively immutable trait.'
Distinguishably, in In re Marriage Cases, I the California Supreme
Court held that sexual orientation is a suspect classification under the
California constitution, reasoning that members of the LGBT
community have experienced a history of invidious discrimination due
to a characteristic that bears no relation to one's ability to function and
contribute to society.' 2 As a result of their contrary suspect
classification analyses, the Conaway court upheld the Maryland same-

4. See id.
5. See generally Conaway v. Deane & Polyak, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007); In re
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
6. See Conaway, 932 A.2d at 609-16 (emphasizing political powerlessness and
immutability); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 441-42 (emphasizing history of purposeful

unequal treatment on the basis of a characteristic that bears no relation to one's ability to
function and contribute to society).
7. See Conaway, 932 A.2d at (holding that Maryland Family Law Code Section 2-201,
defining marriage as the union of one man and one woman, is constitutional); In re Marriage
Cases, 183 P.3d at 453 (holding that California Family Law Code Sections 300 and 308.5,
limiting marriage to the union of one man and one woman, is unconstitutional).
8. 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007).
9. Id. at 616.
10. Id. at 609-616.

II. 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
12. Id. at441-42.
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sex marriage ban under rational basis review, 13 while the In re
Marriage Cases court invalidated
the California same-sex marriage
14
scrutiny.
strict
under
ban
State and federal courts evaluating the constitutionality of
same-sex marriage under the Equal Protection Clause should follow In
re MarriageCases, rather than Conaway, for several reasons. First, the
Conaway court erred not only in its analyses of political powerlessness
and immutability, but also by affording these factors dispositive
weight. 15 The Conaway court failed to recognize that, to the extent
immutability is determinative, sexual orientation is properly
characterized as an immutable trait. 16 In addition, the Conaway court
employed circular reasoning and misapplied federal equal protection
jurisprudence in its political powerlessness inquiry.' 7 In contrast, the
court in In re MarriageCases properly applied heightened scrutiny on
the basis that members of the LGBT community have experienced a
history of invidious discrimination due to a characteristic that bears no
relation to ability to function and contribute to society. 18 Finally, In re
Marriage Cases properly establishes that legislative enactments which
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation warrant heightened
judicial scrutiny. 19
Following this Introduction, Part II outlines the specific facts
and procedural history of Conaway v. Deane & Polyak et al. and In re
Marriage Cases. Part III presents the relevant legal history and
precedent regarding suspect classification analysis in equal protection
jurisprudence. 2 1 Part IV presents
22 the reasoning of the Conaway and In
re Marriage Cases courts.
Part V analyzes the disparate
characterizations of LGBT class status that the Conaway and In re
Marriage Cases courts employed.23 This article concludes that judicial
recognition of sexual orientation as a suspect classification is
consistent with equal protection jurisprudence and is within the proper
role of courts in the context of minority rights.24
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Conaway, 932 A.2d at 635.
In re MarriageCases, 183 P.3d at 446-52.
See infra Part V.A.I.
See infra Part V.A.2.
See infra Part V.A.3.
See infra Part V.A.I.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Part 11.
See infra Part 111.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
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II. THE CASES

A. Conaway v. Deane & Polyak et al.
The plaintiffs in Conaway v. Deane & Polyak et al. included
nine same-sex couples who were denied marriage licenses on the basis
of Maryland Family Law Code Section 2-201, which provides that
"only a marriage between a man and a woman is valid in this state,,25
and one gay man who wished to preserve his right to apply for a
marriage license in the future. 26 The Circuit Court for Baltimore
County granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs2 7 on the
grounds that Section 2-201 discriminates facially on the basis of sex in
violation of Article 46 of the Declaration of Rights of Maryland.28 The
circuit court, however, declined to address plaintiffs substantive due
process and other equal protection arguments. 29 The Maryland Court
of Appeals, the state's highest court, issued a30 writ of certiorari
bypassing the Maryland Court of Special Appeals.
B. In re MarriageCases
In re MarriageCases resulted from the consolidated appeal of
six claims litigated in the California Superior Court and Court of
Appeal 3' in the wake of Lockyer v. City and County of San
Francisco.3 2 In Lockyer, the California Supreme Court held that public

officials of San Francisco, in both the city and county, had acted
unlawfully by issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples absent a
judicial finding that Family Code Sections 300 and 308.5, 3 3 defining
marriage as a union between a man and a woman, are
unconstitutional.34 However, the Lockyer court emphasized that the
substantive issue of the constitutionality of the California marriage

25. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-201 (2006).
26. Conaway, 932 A.2d at 582.
27. Id. at 584.
28. Art. 46, Md. Decl. of Rights (1776) (providing that "equality of rights under the law
shall not be abridged or denied because of sex").
29. Conaway, 932 A.2d at 585.
30. Id.at 584.
31. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P. 3d at 397.
32. 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004).
33. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 300, 308.5 (West 2009).
34. Lockyer v. City & County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004); see also In re
Marriage Cases, 183 P. 3d at 397.
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statutes was not before the court in that case. 35 Thus, the California
Supreme Court granted further review to36address the constitutional
validity of the California marriage statutes.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution provides that "no state shall ... deny to
of the laws." 37

any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
By essentially requiring that "all persons similarly situated should be
treated alike," 38 this constitutional mandate protects citizens against
impermissible discrimination on the part of state legislatures.39 Indeed,
the United States Supreme Court has found that the Equal Protection
Clause "was intended to work nothing less than abolition of all caste
and invidious class-based legislation., 40 As a means to achieve this
end, the Court has developed a three-tiered hierarchy of equal
protection review to determine whether a governmental purpose is
sufficient to justify use of the discriminatory classification in
question. 4 '
Under this tripartite standard, the type of discrimination at
issue dictates whether the legislative purpose must survive strict
judicial scrutiny, heightened scrutiny, or deferential rational basis
review. 42 For example, classifications that are more likely based in
stereotypes and prejudice than legitimate public interests are deemed
constitutionally suspect 43 and, thus, must be narrowly tailored to
further a compelling government purpose. 44 Although the Supreme
35. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P. 3d at 397.

36. Id.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1,cl.2.
38. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985): see also Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,
415 (1920)).
39. Conversely, the Equal Protection Clause places no restrictions on the State's ability
to treated dissimilar persons in a dissimilar manner. Thus, not all discriminatory legislative
classifications violate the Equal Protection Clause. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442 (finding that
legislation classifying on the basis of mental retardation need only be rationally related to a
legitimate government interest because mentally retarded persons have a reduced ability to
cope with and function in the everyday world.); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940)

(stating that "[t]he Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to
be treated in law as though they were the same").
40. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 213 (1982).
41. Watkins v. United States Army, 875, F.2d 699, 712 (9th Cir. 1989).
42. Id.
43. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984).
44. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
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Court has never articulated a bright line diagnostic for identifying
suspect classifications, it has emphasized two factors.4 5 These factors
include whether the burdened class has been subjected to a history of
purposeful unequal treatment and whether the characteristic at issue
bears any relation to an individual's ability to perform or contribute to
society.
A. The Three-TieredHierarchyof Equal Protection Scrutiny
Interpreting the Equal Protection Clause 4 7 in United States v.
Carolene Products,4 8 the United States Supreme Court established the
principle that certain forms of governmental discrimination, including
those 'directed at discrete and insular minorities,' warrant more critical
examination than others. 49 The Carolene Products Court implicitly
recognized that such groups are particularly vulnerable to
impermissible government discrimination because they are too
powerless to forge the necessary alliances to protect their interests in
our pluralist society.5 ° Indeed, the Carolene Products Court opined
that prejudice against such groups "tends to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities., 5 1 According to the Carolene Products rationale, 'discrete
and insular minorities' necessitate special judicial protection from the
majoritarian political process. 52 To the contrary, when economic and
social legislation does not burden a class worthy of enhanced
protection by the courts, the judiciary affords
broad deference to the
53
government.
of
branches
more democratic
In the years since Carolene Products, the Court has developed
a three-tiered framework of equal protection review that involves
several critical steps. 54 As a threshold inquiry, courts identify the

45. See infra Part IiI.B.
46. See infra Part ilI.B.
47. U.S.CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1,cl.2.
48. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
49. Id. at 144 n.4 (asserting that judicial deference to legislative judgments should be
highest in the case of purely regulatory economic legislation, whereas statutes "directed at
discrete and insular minorities" necessitate a more searching level of scrutiny).

50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432,440 (1985).
54. See Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 712 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J.,

concurring).
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classification upon which the legislation discriminates. 55 Next, courts
determine the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny by asking whether
the classification at issue is constitutionally suspect. 56 The Supreme
Court has identified race, alienage, and national origin as "suspect
classifications, 57 or factors that tend to be related to prejudice rather
than any justifiable legislative objective. 58 Government acts
implicating a suspect classification or explicitly burdening a suspect
class are subject to strict judicial scrutiny and must be narrowly
tailored to further a compelling government interest. 59 Thus, under
strict scrutiny, the government bears a significant burden of proof.
The Supreme Court also recognizes several "quasi-suspect"
classifications, or traits that the Court deems relevant to the
achievement of a justifiable state interest under some circumstances

55. See id. For example, laws banning same-sex marriage classify on the basis of sexual
orientation because they allow opposite-sex couples to access the benefits of civil marriage
while denying this right to similarly situated same-sex couples.
56. See id. If the classification at issue has previously been identified as "suspect" by the
United States Supreme Court, then the court must automatically subject the government act to
strict judicial scrutiny. At the present time, this list includes race, alienage and national origin.
If the classification is not included in that list, the court should engage in suspect classification
analysis to determine whether the classification warrants heightened judicial protection. Some
courts have invalidated legislation on the basis that the classification is not even rationally
related to a legitimate government interests, rather than conduct this inquiry.
57. See generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (subjecting
legislation excluding individuals of Japanese ancestry from the west coast of the United States
during World War I1to the most rigid form of equal protection scrutiny); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (applying heightened scrutiny to legislation that made
citizenship a requirement for welfare benefits); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948)
(holding that application of the California Alien Land Law to a minor citizen whose Japanese
father purchased land in his name discriminated against his right to own property based on the
national origin of his father).
58. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (describing suspect classifications as "factors that are so
seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such
considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy"); see also Watkins, 875 F.2d at
712 n.4 (Norris, J.,
concurring) (finding that "[d]iscriminations that burden some despised or
politically powerless groups are so likely to reflect antipathy against those groups that the
classifications are inherently suspect and must be strictly scrutinized"); Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982) (opining that
[s]ome classifications are more likely than others to reflect deep-seated
prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some legitimate
objective. Legislation predicated on such prejudice is easily recognized as
incompatible with the constitutional understanding that each person is to
be judged individually and is entitled to equal justice under the law.
Classifications treated as suspect tend to be irrelevant to any proper
legislative goal.).
59. See e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (1985); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634
(1969); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984).
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but not others. 60 Courts subject legislation implicating a quasi-suspect
classification to intermediate equal protection scrutiny, requiring that it
be substantially related to an important government interest to satisfy
the requirements of constitutionality.'
The Court has applied
intermediate scrutiny to government acts that discriminate on the basis
of gender62 and legitimacy. 63 As with strict scrutiny, intermediate
scrutiny shifts the burden of proof from the party challenging the
legislation to the government. 64 By requiring the government to
demonstrate that the discriminatory legislation is substantially related
to an important government interest, courts are able to identify and
invalidate legislative enactments that are based in animus towards a
particular group.65 Such heightened judicial oversight is particularly
necessary when discrimination
is "unlikely to be timely rectified by
66
legislative means.",

All other legislative enactments, including nearly all economic
and commercial legislation, are subject to highly deferential rational
basis review. 67 Such enactments enjoy a presumption of constitutional
60. See e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (holding that sex is a
suspect classification triggering heightened judicial scrutiny); see also Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S.
456, 461 (1988) (stating that classifications implicating sex or illegitimacy trigger intermediate
scrutiny); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 432 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring, dissenting) (stating that
"[h]eightened but not strict scrutiny is considered appropriate in areas such as gender,
illegitimacy, or alienage because the Court views the trait as relevant under some
circumstances but not others").
61. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (finding that "[t]o withstand
constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve
important government objectives and must be substantially related to those objectives").
62. Id
63. See Clark, 484 U.S. at 461.
64. See e.g., Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688 (invalidating a statutory scheme that categorized
spouses of male uniformed service members, but not spouses of female members, as
dependents for the purpose of benefits, on the grounds that the government failed to prove any
state interest greater than administrative convenience).
65. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (stating that
[tihe general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be
sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest. The general rule gives way, however, when a
statute classifies by race, alienage, or national origin. These factors are so
seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that
laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and
antipathy - a view that those in the class are not as worthy or deserving as
others. For these reasons ... these laws are subjected to strict scrutiny and
will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling
state interest.)
66. Id.
67. See e.g., U.S. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175, 177 (1980)
(quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)).
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validity so long as the classification in the statute is rationally related
68
to a legitimate state interest. Under rational basis scrutiny, a court
determines "whether the classifications drawn in a statute are
reasonable in light of its purpose." 69 By requiring some rational
connection between the classification and the legislative end, courts
seeks to ensure that the purpose of the classification is not to burden
the disadvantaged groups. 70 This relationship need not be
demonstrated with precise certainty, but should not be "so attenuated
as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.' Unlike strict and
intermediate scrutiny, rational basis review requires the party
challenging the discriminatory state action to bear the burden of
proof.7

Rational basis review is so deferential to legislatures that

courts have very rarely invalidated laws under this standard. In the
final step of equal protection review, a court weighs the importance of
the governmental interest being served and the appropriateness of the
government's method of implementation against the resulting
infringement of individual rights to determine whether the challenged
regulation survives the applicable level of scrutiny. 73 By requiring
varying degrees of fit between classification and objective based upon
the likelihood of invidious discrimination, a court ensures that a
government act comports
with the constitutional guarantee of equal
74
protection of the laws.
B. Identifying Suspect and Quasi-Suspect Classifications
Although the Federal Constitution does not explicitly
enumerate any suspect classes, the United States Supreme Court has
68. See Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976)
(reasoning that the rational-basis standard of review inquiry "employs a relatively relaxed
standard reflecting the Court's awareness that the drawing of lines that create distinctions is

peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one. Perfection in making the necessary
classifications is neither possible nor necessary. Such action by a legislature is presumed to be
valid.").
69. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
70. See U.S. RailroadRetirement Bd, 449 U.S. at 181 (Stevens, J. concurring) ("If the

adverse impact on the disfavored class is an apparent aim of the legislature, its impartiality
would be suspect.").
71. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985).
72. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1992) (stating that "[a] State...has no
obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification").
73. See Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 712 (9th Cir. 1989).
74. Romer v. Evans, 517 US 620, 632 (1996) (opining that "the search for the link

between classification and objective gives substance to the Equal Protection Clause; it
provides guidance and discipline for the legislature, which is entitled to know what sorts of
laws it can pass; and it marks the limits of our own authority").
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extended some form of heightened judicial protection
to classifications79
78
77
including race, 75 sex, 76 alienage, national origin, and illegitimacy.
Nevertheless, the Court has neither established a bright line diagnostic
for distinguishing suspect and non-suspect classes nor provided a clear
overarching rationale for why these five classifications, and not others,
warrant enhanced judicial skepticism. Although the Court declared
that race is a constitutionally suspect classification in the 1944 case,
Korematsu v. United States,8° it was not until the early 1970s that the
Court began to articulate specific indicia of suspectness, or8 factors
to
1
determine whether a group is worthy of heightened scrutiny.
In 1971, the Supreme Court invoked Carolene Products to
invalidate a state law denying welfare benefits to noncitizens in
Graham v. Richardson.82 The Court held that classifications based on
alienage are inherently suspect because "noncitizens are a prime
example of a 'discrete and insular' minority for whom heightened
judicial solicitude is appropriate." 83 Two years later, Justice Lewis
Powell developed this line of reasoning in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez,84 explaining that a suspect class must be
"saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of
political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from
the majoritarian political process. ' 85 Later that term, the Court
75. See e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (subjecting legislation
excluding individuals of Japanese ancestry from the west coast of the United States to the
most rigid form of equal protection scrutiny).
76. See e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding that a government act which
discriminate on the basis of gender must be substantially related to an important government
objectives).
77. See e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (applying heightened scrutiny
to legislation that made citizenship a requirement for welfare benefits).
78. See e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
79. See e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988).
80. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
81. In a line of cases beginning in 1971, the Court discussed indicia of suspect
classifications. See Graham, 403 U.S. at 372 (invoking the Carolene Products Court's
mention of 'discrete and insular minorities'); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. V. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. I, 28 (1973) (explaining that a suspect class must be "saddled with such disabilities, or
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of
political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process"); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (giving importance to whether
the classification at issue is determined solely by birth and whether it is related to one's ability
to perform or contribute to society).
82. Graham, 403 U.S. at 372.
83. Id.
84. 411 U.S. I (1973).
85. Id. at 28.
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expanded Justice Powell's analytical framework in Frontiero v.
Richardson,86 where it addressed whether sex was "an immutable
characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth."'8 The Court
declared for the first time that a characteristic's relation to ability to
perform or contribute to society was an important indicator of whether
88
government's use of a characteristic should be deemed suspect.
Despite the piecemeal development of equal protection
doctrine, the United States Supreme Court has consistently prioritized
two indicia of suspectness: (1) whether the group singled out for
unequal treatment has been subjected to long-standing and invidious
discrimination; 89 and (2) whether the group's distinguishing
characteristic bears any relation to the group members' ability to
perform or function in society. 90 For instance, in Massachusetts Board
of Retirement v. Murgia,9 1 the Court held that age is not a suspect
classification and reasoned that
[w]hile the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not
been wholly free of discrimination, such persons,
unlike, say, those who have been discriminated against
on the basis of race or national origin, have not
experienced a 'history of purposeful unequal treatment'
or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of
stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their
abilities.92

86. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
87. Id. at 686.
88. Id. (plurality opinion) (finding that "what differentiates sex from such nonsuspect
statuses as intelligence or physical disability ... is that the sex characteristic frequently bears
no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society").
89. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531-32 (1996); Massachusetts Board of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 US 307, 313 (1976).
90. See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313 (finding that the aged have not been "subjected to
unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their
abilities"); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985) (finding that
mentally disadvantaged are not a quasi-suspect class because "those who are mentally retarded
have a reduced ability to cope with and function in the everyday world"); Frontiero, 411 U.S.
at 686 (distinguishing sex from nonsuspect statuses on the grounds that it "bears no relation to
ability to perform or contribute to society"); Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976)
(analogizing illegitimacy to race and national origin on the basis that it "bears no relation to
the individual's ability to participate in and contribute to society").
91. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
92. Id. at 313; see also Matthews, 427 U.S. at 505 (finding that classifications based on
illegitimacy are subject to heightened scrutiny because the characteristic "bears no relation the
individual's ability to participate in and contribute to society").
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Similarly, in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, the Court
reasoned that the mentally disadvantaged are not suspect because
mental retardation does in fact bear a substantial relationship to the
group's ability to participate in and contribute to society. 93 In
Frontiero v. Richardson, the Court held that sex is a quasi-suspect
classification, opining that "what differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability... is that the sex
characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or
contribute to society. '94 The Court once again applied heightened
scrutiny in Matthews v. Lucas, emphasizing that illegitimacy "bears no
relation to the individual's ability to participate in and contribute to
society. '9 5 These cases make it clear that, when determining suspect
status, the Court affords considerable weight to whether a group has
faced unequal treatment on the basis of a trait that is unrelated to
ability to contribute to society.
In contrast, the United States Supreme Court has treated
immutability and political powerlessness as potentially relevant but
subordinate concerns. 96 In Graham v. Richardson, the Court held that
alienage is a suspect classification 97 despite the fact that attaining
citizenship status would eliminate this characteristic. Instead, the
Graham court emphasized that aliens are a prime example of the
98
'discrete and insular minority' that Carolene sought to protect.
Similarly, in Clark v. Jeter, the Court subjected a statute of limitations
on actions to establish paternity to heightened scrutiny, 99 even though
illegitimacy is a status that ceases to exist in the event that an
illegitimate child's parents marry. Contrarily, the Court declined to
categorize mental retardation as a suspect classification in Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc. despite the undisputed immutability of
the trait. 0 0 The Cleburne Court emphasized that the defining
characteristic was legitimately related to the carrier's ability to
contribute to society.
As Justice Thurgood Marshall opined in his

93.
94.
95.
96.

Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442.
Frontiero,411 U.S. at 686, 688.
Matthews, 427 U.S. at 505-06.
See generally Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).

97. Id. at 376.
98. Id. at 372.
99. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461-65 (1988).
100. City ofCleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 446-47 (1985).
101. Id. at 441. The Cleburne Court demonstrated its skepticism of immutability by
including the following quote from John Ely:

Surely one has to feel sorry for a person disabled by something he or she
can't do anything about, but I'm not aware of any reason to suppose that
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concurring and dissenting opinion in Cleburne, "the political
powerlessness of a group and the immutability of its defining trait are
relevant insofar as they point to a social and cultural isolation that
gives the majority little reason to respect or be concerned with that
group's interests and needs."' 10 2 Thus, political powerlessness and
immutability, while potentially relevant in some cases, are not
dispositive indicators of a suspect classification.
C. Sexual Orientationas a Suspect Classification
The level of scrutiny applicable to legislative acts that
discriminate based on sexual-orientation remains an open question
under federal law, although the United States Supreme Court has come
close to confronting this issue on a handful of occasions. The Court
addressed the right to engage in private homosexual activity in Bowers
v.Hardwick,10 3 upholding a Georgia law criminalizing sodomy on due
process grounds. -04 Since the Bowers plaintiffs did not challenge the
sodomy law on equal protection grounds, the Court declined to address
the level of judicial scrutiny applicable to discrimination based on
sexual orientation. 10 5 Justice Harry Blackmun, in a dissenting opinion
with Justice William Brennan, Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice
John Stevens, criticized the majority for declining to apply the Equal
Protection Clause, stating that
[w]ith respect to the Equal Protection Clause's
applicability to § 16-6-2, I note that Georgia's exclusive
stress before this Court on its interest in prosecuting
homosexual activity despite the gender-neutral terms of

elected officials are unusually unlikely to share that feeling. Moreover,
classifications based on physical disability and intelligence are typically
accepted as legitimate, even by judges and commentators who assert that
immutability is relevant. The explanation, when one is given, is that those
characteristics (unlike the one the commentator is trying to render suspect)
are often relevant to legitimate purposes. At that point there's not much
left of the immutability theory, is there?
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 150

(1980).
102. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 472 n.24 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
103. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
104. Id. at 196 (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution does not confer any fundamental right on homosexuals to engage in
acts of consensual sodomy, even in the privacy of their own homes).
105. Id.at 201 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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the statute may raise serious questions of discriminatory
enforcement.l16

However, despite the warning of these four justices that
Georgia's anti-sodomy law was likely grounded in prejudice towards
homosexuals, the Bowers majority emphasized that the Constitution
does not confer a fundamental right to engage in consensual
07
homosexual sodomy, even in the privacy of one's own home. 1
Ten years later in Romer v. Evans, 10 8 the Court struck down a
class-based Colorado constitutional amendment that prohibited gay
rights ordinances on equal protection grounds.
The Court
established that neither the public's moral disapproval nor the
legislator's dislike could serve as a legitimate justification for the state
to disfavor a particular social group.
In 2003, the Court explicitly
overruled its infamous decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, holding in
Lawrence v. Texas"'l that a Texas law criminalizing homosexual
sodomy violated the liberty and privacy guarantees of the
constitutional right to due process.'2 In Lawrence, the Court once
again circumvented the suspect classification inquiry and instead
applied rational basis scrutiny to invalidate the law on due process
grounds. 1 3 In her concurring opinion, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
argued that the Court should have found the sodomy law
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds because the conduct that
the statute targeted was closely correlated with homosexuality, thus
discriminating against homosexual persons as a class.' 14 Justice
O'Connor avoided the suspect class issue by arguing that the sodomy
law would have failed even under rational basis review 115 and
106. Id. ("I disagree with the Court's refusal to consider whether § 16-6-2 runs afoul of
the Eighth or Ninth Amendments or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
107. Id. at 196.
108. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
109. Id. at 635-36
110. Id. at 634-35.
Ill. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
112. Id. at 578.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 582-83 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 582 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Moral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an
interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal
Protection Clause. Indeed, we have never held that moral disapproval,
without any other asserted state interest, is a sufficient rationale under the
Equal Protection Clause to justify a law that discriminates among groups
of persons.
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emphasizing that her reasoning does not extend to the same-sex
marriage context.' 6 Nevertheless, in a lengthy dissent with Justice
Clarence Thomas and Justice William Rehnquist, Justice Antonin
Scalia scathingly asserted that Justice O'Connor had laid the
foundation for constitutional challenges to same-sex marriage bans on
the grounds that sexual orientation is a suspect classification.' 7 In
addition, Justice Scalia accused the majority of effectively decreeing
"the end of all morals legislation."' 18
Although the Supreme Court has never squarely confronted
whether sexual orientation is a suspect classification, a number of
lower courts have done so.' 19 In considering whether statutes that
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation are constitutionally
suspect, most state and federal appellate courts have found that, unlike
race, sex, or national origin, sexual orientation should not be2
considered a suspect classification for equal protection purposes.1 0
However, a number of state appellate judges have concluded that
sexual orientation properly should be considered a suspect
classification
for purposes of analysis under their state equal protection
12
clauses.

1

IV. THE COURT'S REASONING

A. Conaway v. Deane & Polyak et al.
In Conaway v. Deane & Polyak et al., the Maryland Court of
Appeals upheld the constitutionality of Maryland Family Law Code
Section 2-201 on the grounds that statutory prohibition of same-sex
marriage is rationally related to the state's interest in fostering a stable
environment for procreation and child rearing. 122 The Conaway court
predicated its application of rational basis review, the most deferential
Id.
116. Id. at585.
dissenting).
117. Id. at 600-02 (Scalia, J.,
118. Id.at 599.
119. See Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 818
(11 th Cir. 2004); High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, 895 F.2d
563 (9th Cir. 1990); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 975 (Wash. 2006).
120. See e.g., Andersen, 138 P.3d at 973-76; Lofton, 358 F.3d at 818, 818 n.16
(concluding that gays and lesbians are not a suspect class and citing cases from the fourth,
fifth, sixth, seventh, ninth, and tenth circuits similarly declining to recognize sexual orientation

as a suspect classification).
121. See Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 27-29 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J. dissenting);
concurring).
Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 1029-32 (Wash. 2006) (Bridge, J.,
122. Conaway v. Deane & Polyak, 932 A.2d 571, 629-35 (Md. 2007).
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of equal protection standards, on the finding that §2-201 neither
abridges the fundamental right to marriage, discriminates on the basis
of sex in violation of Article 46 of the Maryland Declaration
23 of Rights
nor otherwise implicates a suspect or quasi-suspect class.'
The Conaway court held that statutes that discriminate on the
basis of sexual orientation do not trigger heightened scrutiny under
Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.' 24 The court
considered four indicia: (1) the history of purposeful unequal
treatment; (2) the relation between classification and ability to function
and contribute to society; (3) political powerlessness; and (4)
immutability. 125 The Conaway court recognized that Maryland case
law describes a suspect class as "a category of people who have
'experienced a history of purposeful unequal treatment' or been
'subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotypical
characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities," but nevertheless
26
looked to Supreme Court jurisprudence for additional factors.'
The Conaway court acknowledged that gays and lesbians have
undoubtedly experienced a history of purposeful unequal treatment
and that sexual orientation is unrelated to the ability to function and
contribute to society,' 27 but placed decisive emphasis upon the
remaining two criteria of suspectness-political powerlessness and
immutability. 128 The court cited a laundry list of state antidiscrimination statutes to illustrate that gay and lesbian Marylanders
are not sufficiently politically powerless to necessitate enhanced
judicial protection from the majoritarian political process., 29 In
addition, the Conaway court reasoned that there does not appear to be
consensus among experts as to the origin of an individual's sexual
orientation. 130 The court further explained that "the scientific and
sociological evidence currently available to the public" does not
conclusively prove that sexual orientation is immutable.' 3 1 As a result,
123. Id. at 635.
124. Id. at 616.
125. Id. at 606-16.
126. Id. at 606-7 (reasoning that "Article 24 is construed at least to the same extent as the
Fourteenth Amendment").
127. Id. at 609 (opining that "[hiomosexual persons have been the object of societal
prejudice by private actors as well as by the judicial and legislative branches of federal and
state governments. Gay, lesbian, and bisexual persons likewise have been subject to unique
disabilities not truly indicative of their abilities to contribute meaningfully to society."). See
also id. at 609-10 for a discussion of historical discrimination against the LGBT community.
128. Id. at611-16.
129. Id.at 611-14.
130. Id. at615 n.57.
131. Id.at 614.
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the Conaway court concluded that gays and lesbians did not merit
suspect status and ultimately upheld the constitutionality of a
Maryland statute denying the benefits of civil marriage to same-sex
couples and their children.
B. In re MarriageCases
Despite the existence of comprehensive domestic partnership
legislation in California, the court in In re Marriage Cases held that a
statutory scheme permitting only opposite-sex couples to enter into a
marriage-designated relationship impermissibly denies same-sex
couples the equal protection of the laws under Article I Section 7 of
the California Constitution.' 32 Resolving as a threshold matter that
Sections 300 and 308.5 of the California Family Code discriminate on
the basis of sexual orientation, 133 the court established that sexual
orientation is a suspect classification and that statutes drawing a
distinction based on sexual orientation should accordingly be subject
to strict scrutiny review. 134
In analyzing whether sexual orientation is a suspect
classification, the court in In re Marriage Cases considered whether
the defining characteristic: (1) is based upon an immutable trait; (2)
bears no relation to an individual's ability to perform or contribute to
society; and (3) is "associated with a stigma of inferiority or second
class citizenship manifested by the group's history of legal and social
disabilities."' 35 Affirming the California Court of Appeals' finding that
the criteria related to individual's ability to perform in society and
history of stigmatization are readily satisfied in cases involving gays
and lesbians, the court turned its attention to the more controversial
immutability criterion. 136 The court concluded that immutability is not
invariably required for a characteristic to be considered a suspect
classification for equal protection purposes, reasoning that religion and
alienage are suspect classifications under California law despite the
132. In re MarriageCases, 183 P.3d 384,453 (Cal. 2008).
133. Id. at440-41.

134. Id.at 441-44 (finding that
[b]ecause sexual orientation, like gender, race, or religion, is a
characteristic that frequently has been the basis for biased and improperly
stereotypical treatment and that generally bears no relation to an
individual's ability to perform or contribute to society, it is appropriate for
courts to evaluate with great care and with considerable skepticism any
statute that embodies this classification).
135. Id. at 442.
136. Id.
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fact that both conditions are subject to change. 137 In addition, the court
emphasized that it is not appropriate to require a person to repudiate or
change his or her sexual orientation to avoid discriminatory treatment
because a38 person's sexual orientation is an integral aspect of one's
identity. 1
The In re Marriage Cases court also rejected the California
Attorney General's alternative argument that a suspect classification is
appropriately recognized only for minorities who are unable to use the
political process to address their needs.' 39 The court found that a
group's current political powerlessness is not a prerequisite to a
characteristic's being considered a constitutionally suspect basis for
differential treatment. 40 Instead, the court declared that
[t]he most important factors in deciding whether a
characteristic should be considered a constitutionally
suspect basis for classification are whether the class of
persons who exhibit a certain characteristic historically
has been subjected to invidious and prejudicial
treatment, and whether society now recognizes that the
characteristic in question generally bears no
relationship to the individual's ability to perform or
contribute to society."14
Consequently, the In re Marriages court determined that legislative
enactments that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation should
be subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny.
V.

ANALYSIS

In Conaway v. Deane & Polyak, et aL, the Maryland Court of
Appeals erred by treating immutability and political powerlessness as
42
decisive indicia of suspect status rather than supplementary factors. 1
However, to the extent that immutability and political powerlessness
are relevant to suspect class analysis, sexual orientation is immutable
in the equal protection context, and members of the LGBT community
are sufficiently politically powerless to necessitate enhanced judicial
137. Id. at442-43.
138. Id. (citing Hemandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000)).
139. Id. at 443.
140. Id.
141. Id.

142. See infra Part V.A.I.
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protection. Therefore, the Conaway court should have reached the
conclusion that sexual orientation is a suspect or quasi-suspect
classification despite overstating the significance of immutability and
political powerlessness. Distinguishably, the California Supreme Court
in In re MarriageCases properly recognized that neither immutability
nor political powerlessness is a prerequisite of suspect status. 3 The In
re Marriage Cases court accurately emphasized that gays and lesbians
have experienced a history of purposeful unequal treatment due to a
characteristic that bears no relation to their ability to contribute to
society. 144 Pursuant to this rationale, classifications that implicate
sexual orientation are at minimum quasi-suspect, and must be
necessary to fulfill an important government interest. Judicial
recognition of sexual orientation as a suspect classification is
consistent with the appropriate role of courts vis-d-vis legislatures in
safeguarding minority rights. For these reasons, courts should follow
the In re Marriage Cases suspect classification analysis rather than
that of Conaway v. Deane & Polyak, et al.
A. Suspect ClassificationAnalysis in the Same-Sex MarriageContext
Laws denying civil marriage rights to same-sex couples
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. Thus, judicial
recognition of sexual orientation as a suspect classification is
extremely significant in the marriage equality context because it would
require courts to strictly scrutinize statutory same-sex marriage bans.
Strict scrutiny has been described as "strict in theory and fatal and
fact" because laws subjected to its heavy burden rarely pass
constitutional muster. 145 Thus, it is exceedingly unlikely that courts
would uphold the constitutionality of statutory same-sex marriage bans
under strict scrutiny.
In deciding the appropriate degree of deference to afford a
Maryland law defining marriage as the union of one man and one
woman, the Maryland Court of Appeals in Conaway v. Deane &
Polyak, et al. held that sexual orientation is not a suspect
classification. 146 The Conaway court reasoned that sexual orientation
is not conclusively immutable and that gays and lesbians are not
sufficiently politically powerless to merit enhanced judicial
143. See infra Part V.A. 1.
144. See infra Part V.A. 1.
145. Gerald Gunther, Foreword. In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).

146. 932 A.2d 571, 616 (Md. 2007).
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protection. 147 The Conaway court's suspect classification analysis is
problematic in three ways. First, the Conaway court improperly treated
immutability and political powerlessness as dispositive rather than
persuasive factors. 14 8 As a result, the court significantly undervalued
the history of purposeful and unequal treatment that gays and lesbians
have experienced on the basis of a characteristic not indicative of their
ability to contribute to society. 149 Second, the Conaway court failed to
recognize that sexual orientation is effectively immutable in the equal
protection context.' 50 Third, the Conaway court relied upon circular
reasoning and misapplied federal ecIual protection jurisprudence in its
analysis of political powerlessness.
1. Immutability and PoliticalPowerlessness are not Dispositive
Indiciaof Suspectness
The piecemeal development of equal protection doctrine has
arguably left the boundaries of constitutionally suspect legislative
classifications unclear. 152 Within this tentative area of law, the
immutability of a group's distinguishing characteristic is a particularly
abstract and controversial indicator of suspectness. The United States
Supreme Court has repeatedly omitted immutability from its suspect
classification analyses,' 53 demonstrating that immutability is a factor,
not a requirement, of suspectness. 154 Accordingly, when the Court
147. Id. at 609-16.
148. See infra Part V.A. I.
149. See infra Part V.A.I.
150. See infra Part V.A.2.
151. See infra Part V.A.3.
152. See generally, Suzanne Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV.
481(2004).
153. See Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976)
(analyzing whether age is a suspect classification without considering immutability); San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. V. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (declining to consider
immutability when analyzing whether legislation that classifies on the basis of wealth is
constitutionally suspect); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440-41
(1985) (omitting immutability from analysis of whether mental retardation is a suspect
classification). See also Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The
Visibility Presumption and the Case of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, ' 108 YALE L.J. 485, 490-91
(1998) [hereinafter Assimilationist Bias] (observing that "the courts have variously cast doubt
on immutability by citing academic critiques of it, by interpreting it expansively, by
emphasizing that it is a factor rather than a requirement, and by simply omitting it from their
formulations of the strict scrutiny test").
154. See Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique ofthe
Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 507 n.l I (1993-94) (citing Bowen v.
Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602-603 (1987); Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) and
stating that "I am unaware of any case in which the Supreme Court has gone beyond this
moderated emphasis on immutability").
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considered immutability for the first time in Frontiero v.
Richardson,155 it indicated that immutability is a factor that intensifies
the invidiousness of government-imposed burdens
that are not
56
sufficiently related to an important state interest. 1
Legal scholars have exposed a range of problems inherent in
immutability analysis. For example, Bruce Ackerman points out that
"anonymous and diffuse" groups are often more susceptible to
isolation from the majoritarian political process than are Carolene
Products' "discrete and insular" minorities for the very reason that
their defining characteristics are mutable or can be hidden.' 57 This
reasoning exposes an "assimilationist bias in equal protection
jurisprudence," which is evident in the courts' tendency to "withhold
heightened scrutiny from groups that can change or conceal their
defining trait. ' 158 The sentiment that gays and lesbians can and should

change or conceal their sexual orientation arguably underlies the
Conaway court's over-emphasis of immutability.
The Conaway court failed to subject Maryland's same-sex
marriage ban to heightened judicial scrutiny, explaining that "we
decline on the record in the present case to recognize sexual
orientation as an immutable trait and therefore a suspect or quasisuspect classification" (emphasis added). 159 This explanation clearly
indicates that the Conaway court improperly afforded decisive weight
to immutability. To the contrary, the In re Marriage Cases court held
that laws discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation are
constitutionally suspect, accurately emphasizing that "immutability is

155. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
156. Id. at 686-87; see also Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of
Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 507-09
(1994) (asserting that
[t]wo features of the Court's subsequent treatment of immutability were
accurately foreshadowed in Frontiero. First, immutability is not a
requirement, but a factor. Second, that factor is not immutability alone
but immutability-plus... [T]he Frontiero plurality determined that
heightened scrutiny was needed in cases involving sex discrimination
because "the sex characteristic," in addition to being immutable,
"frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society."
Frontiero thus expresses a conclusion that, when a characteristic is both
immutable and unrelated to the legitimate purpose at hand, discrimination
based on it may suggest unfairness.).
157. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723-24
(1985).
158. Assimilationist Bias, supra note 153, at 490.
159. Conaway v. Deane & Polyak, et al., 932 A.2d 571, 616 (Md. 2007).
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not invariably required for a characteristic to 0be considered a suspect
classification for equal protection purposes."16
Federal equal protection jurisprudence indicates that political
powerlessness, like immutability, is not a required condition of suspect
classifications. 16 1 The Rodriguez Court first introduced the political
powerlessness prong of suspect classification doctrine when it
established that a suspect class must be
[S]addled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a
history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to
such a position of political powerlessness as to
command
extraordinary
protection
from 62 the
1
added).
(emphasis
process"
political
majoritarian
The particular formulation of the Rodriguez analytical framework,
including the deliberate use of the conjunction "or," indicates that
political powerlessness is not unequivocally required, but is rather one
of several key considerations. In addition, political powerlessness is
not a requirement of suspect classification because its analysis is
problematic. As the Supreme Court of Connecticut recently pointed
out,
The Court has accorded little weight to a group's
political power because that factor, in contrast to the
other criteria, frequently is not discernible by reference
to objective standards. Thus, an attempt to quantify a
group's political influence often will involve a myriad
of complex and interrelated considerations 1of
63 a kind not
readily susceptible to judicial fact-finding.
Like the Carolene Court's focus on 'discrete and insular
minorities,' 1 64 the purpose of the 'political powerlessness' and 'history
of purposeful unequal treatment' criteria is to identify and protect a
subordinated class that is particularly unable to protect itself.' 65 In
contrast, the 'immutability' and 'relationship to ability to function in
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442 (Cal. 2008).
See supra Part Ill.
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 957 A.2d 407, 429 (Conn. 2008).
United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).

165. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID

OF THE CLOSET 206-09 (Harvard University Press 1999) (contrasting class-based equal
protection analysis with classification-based analysis).
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society' criteria, which invoke principles of fairness, identify
classifications that are particularly prone to impermissible
discrimination.166 Considering that the 'political powerlessness' and
'history of discrimination' factors serve an analogous purpose, it
seems unnecessary that both conditions must unequivocally be
satisfied. Indeed, the very finding that a group has endured a history of
oppression suggests that it is likely to be disadvantaged by the
majoritarian political system. 167 It follows that, in the context of
suspect classification analysis, the political powerlessness inquiry is
rendered moot by a clear finding that a group has been subjected to a
history of purposeful unequal treatment. Having conceded that gays
and lesbians have endured such a history of discrimination, 168 the
Conaway court should not have treated political powerlessness as
dispositive.
2. Sexual Orientationis Immutable in the Equal Protection
Context
To the extent that immutability is dispositive of suspectness,
sexual orientation should be considered immutable in the equal
protection context. Plausible formulations of immutable characteristics
include the following: (1) traits that the carrier is physically unable to
change or mask; (2) traits that can be changed, but only with great
difficulty; and (3) traits that are so central to personal identity that the
carrier's ability to change them is irrelevant. 169 Federal Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence makes it clear that equal protection
immutability need not reach the high burden of strict immutability, or
absolute insusceptibility to change or concealment.' 70 For example, the
166. Id.
167. See Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.3d 699, 727 (9th Cir. 1989) (reasoning
that "[t]he very fact that homosexuals have historically been underrepresented in and
victimized by political bodies is itself strong evidence that they lack the political power
necessary to ensure fair treatment at the hands of government.").
168. Conaway v. Deane & Polyak, et al., 932 A.2d 571, 609-10 (Md. 2007).
169. Watkins v. United States Army, 837 F.2d 1428, 1446 (9th Cir. 1988).
170. Id. (asserting that
[i]t is clear that by "immutability" the Court has never meant strict
immutability in the sense that members of the class must be physically
unable to change or mask the trait defining their class. People can have
operations to change their sex. Aliens can ordinarily become naturalized
citizens. The status of illegitimate children can be changed. People can
frequently hide their national origin be changing their customs, their
names, or their associations. Lighter skinned blacks can sometimes "pass"
for white, as can Latinos for Anglos, and some people can even change
their racial appearance with pigment injections. At minimum then, the
Supreme Court is willing to treat a trait as effectively immutable if
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Supreme Court has held that illegitimacy is quasi-suspect although it is
an arguably mutable trait, whereas as age and mental disability are not
suspect despite their immutability. 171
The Conaway court erred by considering only the strict
biological immutability of sexual orientation, rather than applying the
nuanced conception of immutability that federal equal protection
jurisprudence has generated. Although significant scientific evidence
supports a biological basis to homosexuality, it is equally, if not more
important, that "sexual orientation, no matter what causes it, acquires
social and political meaning through the material and symbolic
activities of living people."17 Accordingly, the Conaway court failed
to recognize that "sexual orientation and sexual identity are
immutable; they are so fundamental to one's identity that a person
should not be required to abandon them."' 173 As the In re Marriage
Cases court recognized, characterizing sexual orientation as a mutable
trait in the equal protection context is unacceptable because "it is not
appropriate to require a person to repudiate or change his
or her sexual
174
treatment."
discriminatory
avoid
to
orientation in order
3. Gays and Lesbians Are PoliticallyPowerless in the Equal
Protection Context
The Conaway court erred when it cited statutory protections
against sexual orientation discrimination in Maryland as evidence that
gays and lesbians are not politically powerless, and therefore not a
suspect class. Any disadvantaged group with the ability to successfully
access political and judicial forums to challenge discrimination would
arguably fail the political powerlessness prong under this reasoning. If
followed to its logical end, "this inquiry could actually support
removal of traits such as race and sex from the list of suspect
classifications, contrary to the Court's expressed intent, in light of
substantial legislation prohibiting differential treatment based on race

changing it would involve great difficulty, such as requiring a major
physical change or a traumatic change of identity.).
171. See e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 484 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (holding that classifications
implicating illegitimacy are subject to heightened scrutiny); Massachusetts Board of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (holding that age is not a suspect classification);
City of Cleburne v. Clebume, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that mental retardation is not a
suspect classification).
172. Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the
Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 506 (1994).

173. Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000).
174. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384,442-43 (Cal. 2008).
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and sex. ' '1 75 Also recognizing this theoretical inconsistency in political
powerlessness analysis, William Eskridge points out that
[c]ontrary to Carolene Products,the Court's practice in
equal protection cases rarely
protects
powerless
minorities; instead, the Court tends to protect
previously powerless groups once it has become clear
that the group is politically mobilized
and potentially a
76
system.'
pluralist
the
partner in
Several factual considerations also undermine the Conaway
court's reasoning. First, the Supreme Court identified sex as a quasisuspect classification in 1973, years after significant legislative
protections for women, including the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
Voting Rights Act, took effect. 177 In addition, although LGBT
Marylanders admittedly enjoy some legal protections against
discrimination, they are denied myriad rights and benefits simply
because they are precluded from civil marriage. 17 In fact, committed
same-sex couples in Maryland have been unable to gain equal access
to 425 state statutory protections and over 1,000 federal rights,
responsibilities, and privileges available to married opposite-sex
179
couples and their children, despite their alleged political influence.
Chief Judge Robert Bell of the Maryland Court of Appeals articulated
this conundrum in his dissenting opinion in Conaway, opining that
piecemeal civil advances for gays and lesbians do not indicate that the
180
right to marry is imminent or inevitable for same-sex couples.
Indeed, Chief Judge Bell seems to suggest that the impetus for
175. Suzanne Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 504-05 (2004).

176. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET
229 (Harvard University Press 1999).
177. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687-88 (1973) (characterizing the
enactment of laws prohibiting sex discrimination as confirming that a class of individuals had
been subjected to widespread discrimination in the past and thus supporting the need for
heightened judicial scrutiny of statutory provisions that impose differential treatment on the
basis of such a characteristic).
178. Conaway v. Deane & Polyak, et al., 932 A.2d 571, 646 (Md. 2007). (Raker, J.,
concurring, dissenting) (opining that "despite Maryland's recent statutory, regulatory, and case
law that has evolved to equalize some legal protections of heterosexuals and homosexuals,
same-sex couples are denied the protection of hundreds of laws simply because they are not
yet entitled to the rights and benefits flowing from marriage").
179.
ACT:

U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT No. 04-4353R, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE
UPDATE
TO
PRIOR
REPORT
(2004),
available
at

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf.
180. Conaway v. Deane & Polyak, et al., 932 A.2d 571, 694 (Md. 2007) (Bell, C.J.,
dissenting).
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incrementally affording these rights to gays and lesbians is to avoid
awarding them equal marriage rights.' 8 1
B. The Appropriate Role of Courts vis-6-vis Legislaturesin
Recognition of Sexual Orientationas a Suspect Classification
Although the judiciary has a clear obligation to enforce
constitutional limitations upon legislative measures under the
separation of powers doctrine, the thorny query of when, how much,
and why courts should scrutinize discriminatory government acts
persists. Not surprisingly, the appropriate role of courts in the
recognition and protection of minority rights has been a recurring
theme throughout Nineteenth and Twentieth Century constitutional
jurisprudence. The view that the court's role is merely to remove
barriers to minority participation in the political process is plainly
flawed because "the duty of representation that lies at the core of our
system requires more than a voice and a vote." 182 In our democratic
system, those with the most votes are clearly in the position to
prioritize their own interests at the expense of others. While some
minority groups may successfully ally themselves with other factions
to protect their interests against infringement at the hands of the
majority, others are precluded from the benefits of this pluralist
political process. Indeed, it was these discrete and insular minorities'
that the Carolene Court wished to protect.
Judicial activism is arguably best justified when the invidious
oppression of vulnerable groups undermines the democratic political
process. 8 3 In this sense, heightened judicial scrutiny of discriminatory
government acts is fittingly characterized as curative of democratic
processes, rather than countermajoritarian, in that it facilitates the
representation of minorities. As the Supreme Court's landmark civil
181. Id.
182. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 135
(Harvard University Press, 1980) (asserting that
[s]ome commentators have suggested that the Court's role in protecting
minorities should consist only in removing barriers to their participation in
the political process. We have seen, however - and the realization is one
that threads our constitutional document - that the duty of representation
that lies at the core of our system requires more than a voice and a vote.
No matter how open the process, those with most of the votes are in a
position to vote themselves advantages at the expense of the others, or
otherwise refuse to take their interests into account.).
183. See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). See also
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

University Press, 1980).

135 (Harvard
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rights decisions in Loving v. Virginia184 and Brown v. Board of
Education18 5 indicate, the Court should not permit an unconstitutional
86
situation to fester because it enjoys broad public support.
Recognizing the application of this principle to civil marriage rights,
the Massachusetts Supreme Court eloquently opined that the history of
constitutional law "is the story of the extension of constitutional rights
and protections to people once ignored or excluded." 87 It is clear that
legislative enactments excluding same-sex couples and their children
from the benefits of civil marriage classify on the basis of sexual
orientation.18 8 Accordingly, if sexual orientation is a constitutionally
suspect classification, statutes defining marriage as the union of a man
and a woman must be necessary to further a compelling government
interest.
VI. CONCLUSION

So long as laws deny same-sex couples and their children the
benefits of civil marriage, they will undoubtedly face equal protection
challenges. In considering these constitutional disputes, courts should
carefully consider their vital role in protecting minority classes against
impermissible discrimination by powerful majorities. Applying
heightened judicial scrutiny to legislative enactments that discriminate
on the basis of sexual orientation is an overdue step towards equal
protection of the laws for same-sex couples. Immutability and political
powerlessness are supplementary rather than determinative indicia of
suspectness and, as such, need not be considered. However, to the
extent that courts choose to afford immutability and political
powerlessness dispositive weight, both factors indicate that sexual
orientation is a suspect classification. The long history of purposeful
and unequal treatment that gays and lesbians have suffered on the
basis of a characteristic bearing no relation to ability to function in
society further confirms that they are a class deserving of special
judicial solicitude. Thus, courts should follow the equal protection
analysis of In re MarriageCases rather than that of Conaway v. Deane
& Polyak, et al. by subjecting government acts that discriminate on the
basis of sexual orientation to heightened equal protection scrutiny.
184. See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
185. See generally Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

186. Goodridge v. Massachusetts Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 958 n.16
(Mass. 2003).
187. Id.at 966 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557 (1996)).

